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tuted in that court by defendant Viola M. Treutle against 
this plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 20, 1956, defendant, Viola M. Treutle, 
filed her complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, praying for a decree of divorce awarding her 
$500.00 per month support money, $500.00 per month 
alimony, an attorney's fee of $500.00, and the care, cus-
tody and control of the minor child of the parties. This 
action was assigned Civil No. 109931, in defendant Court 
(R. 2). 
On December 17, 1956, 87 days after the complaint 
was filed, a summons was apparently signed by defend-
.ant'.s counsel, Dwight L. King (R. 10). The original 
summons contains a date and time stamp, indicating it 
was received by the Sheriff of the City of New Y ark, 
December 19, 1956 (R. 10). It is not clear why the sum-
mons was sent to the Sheriff of the City of New York, in 
view of the allegations of the con1plaint, that the plain-
tiff's "earnings" are ~~outside of the l'Tnited States," 
but in any event, on l\Iarch 5, 1957, the New York City 
Sheriff filed his return indicating the su1mnons and 
co1npl,aint had not been served as of February 25, 1957. 
Although no other sunnnons or notice of any kind 
had been given to the plaintiff herein, defendant court 
on Dce(linber :2S, 1956, conducted a purported hearing 
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of the divorce action, as revealed by the following entry 
on the official minutes of that court: 
"The within entitled matter now comes before 
the Court for hearing, the plaintiff and her coun-
sel, Dwight L. King being present in person; the 
defendant not appearing or being represented by 
counsel. vVhereupon Viola M. Treutle is sworn 
and exan1ined. The Court, now being fully advised 
in the premises, orders that the plaintiff's testi-
mony is perpetuated." ( R. 5) 
As admitted in the defendant's answeT on file in 
this Court, no stenographic record was made of this 
purported hearing. No record of any kind is found in 
the court's file concerning the "perpetuated" testimony 
purportedly given by the defendant Viola M. Treutle on 
that day. 
At the time of this so-called "hearing," Mrs. Treutle 
knew she was about to leave this state, and shortly 
thereafter she left Utah to accept employment in Wash-
ington, D. C. (Defendant's answer Page 2). On January 
4, 1957, Dwight L. King signed a written motion inform-
ing the court of the address of this plaintiff in the 
city of Caracas, Venezuela, and moving the court for 
an order of publication of sum1nons in the Salt Lake 
Times, a newspaper of general circulation (R. 7). Pur-
suant to this motion, the District Court, by Joseph G. 
Jeppson, ,Judge, entered its order directing that sum-
mons hr pnhliHhed upon thiH plaintiff, in that nevvspaper, 
onee e.ach \veek for a period of four successive weeks. 
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It was further ordered that within ten days the County 
Clerk should mail a copy of the summons and complaint 
to this plain tiff in Venezuela ( R. 6). 
Publication was completed on February 8, 1957, as 
evidenced by the affidavit of the publisher, which was 
filed in the court March 5, 1957, although dated Febru-
ary 8, 1957 (R. 9). 
On March 5, 1957, plaintiff's counsel appeared be-
fore the court to obtain the "decree of divorce." The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the defend-
ant court state that the divorce action "came on regularly 
to be heard before" the defendant court on that day (R. 
17). The same language is to be found in the Decree 
(R. 21). The Findings, Conclusions and Decree were 
signed and entered March 12, 1957. 
At the time of the purported "regular hearing" of 
the divorce action on 1Iarch 5, 1957, service of smnmons 
upon this plaintiff was not yet con1plete, inasmuch as 
the Clerk of the defendant court had not then made 
his affidavit that he had n1ailed a copy of the complaint 
and su1nn1ons to this plaintiff, as required by Rule ±(f) 
(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and as ordered by 
the court on J anunry ±, 1957 (R. 16). It is also noted 
in the defendant court's record that the return of process 
by the Sheriff of the City of N t'\Y York and the affidavit 
of thP pnbli~her of the Salt Lake Tilnes were each filed 
on the ~HJllt\ day as the purported hearing (See R. 9, 
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and the return of the Sheriff, which IS not numbered 
but which follows Record 14). 
Upon this state of the record the defendant court 
made its official Ininute entry reading as follows: 
"This case comes now on before the Court 
for hearing, the plaintiff appearing in person and 
being represented by Dwight L. King as counsel; 
the defendant not appearing either in person or 
by coun.sel. A proof of publication of summons 
being of record and on file herein, the default 
of the defendant is ordered entered. Plaintiff is 
sworn and examined in her own behalf. Upon 
the evidence adduced, the court orders that plain-
tiff be granted an interlocutory decree of divorce 
from the defendant as prayed." (R. 15) 
These official minutes of the court are In direct 
conflict with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree, inas1nuch as the latter docmnents contain the 
statement that the plaintiff appeared "by her attorney," 
whereas in the minutes it is said that she appeared in 
person and was "sworn and examined in her own behalf." 
There .are further conflicts in that the minutes indicate 
that the decree of divorce was granted "as prayed," 
whereas the actual decree is not in conformity with the 
prayer of the complaint (R. 21, 22). 
Defendants' answer in the Supre1ne Court admits 
there was no stenographic record 1nade of the "hearing" 
of 11arch 5 and that the decree of March 12 was based 
upon evidence which was claimed to have been .adduced 
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and "perpetuated" before the court December 28, 1956. It 
is further admitted that there was no evidence presented 
March 5, and that the decree was not based on evidence 
adduced on March 5, 1957. The described contradictions 
between the minutes and decree of the court are also 
conceded by the defendants' answer. 
Plaintiff commenced this original proceeding by 
filing his complaint against Mrs. Treutle and the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. Upon this complaint, .a Writ 
in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari was issued by this 
Court on September 16, 1957. The record of proceedings 
before the District Court was filed in this Court on 
September 26, 1957. By his complaint plaintiff seeks 
an order of this Court vacating and annulling the pur-
ported decree of divorce. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION 
IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE 'VHEN THERE 
WAS NO "LEGAL EVIDENCE TAKEN IN THE CAUSE," 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 30-3-4, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND EXCEEDED 
ITS JURISDICTION, IN THAT SUMMONS DID NOT ISSUE 
WITHIN TI-IREE MONTHS FROl\I THE DATE OF THE 
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT. 
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ARG1JMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION 
IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE WHEN THERE 
WAS NO "LEGAL EVIDENCE TAKEN IN THE CAUSE," 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 30-3-4, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. 
It is admitted by the defendants that defendant 
\'"iola ~I. Treutle made but one personal appearance 
before the District Court during the time that her action 
for divorce was pending in that court. This appearance 
was made December 28, 1956, but there is no way for 
this Court, or this plaintiff, to determine what, if any, 
evidence was presented on that occasion. It is not known 
\vhether she appeared in open court, or in chambers. 
In .any event, it is ad1nitted, in defendants' answer, 
that no stenographic notes were taken. No other written 
record was made to reflect the actual words spoken or 
even to record the substance of whatever it was that 
1Irs. Treutle told the court on that occasion. 
The only record which can be found is contained 
rn the minutes of the defendant court, wherein it is 
stated that I\f rs. Treutle was S\vorn .and examined and 
the court ordered that h(•r testi1nony "is perpetuated'' 
(R. 5). vVhere, or hovv, or in or on what, it is perpetuated 
is not revealed. 
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This was not a case in which it was permissible to 
perpetuate testimony. Rule 27 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides in great detail for the cases and 
circumstances in which testimony may be perpetuated. 
The rule is clear that perpetuation is permitted in those 
instances in which a suit has not been filed but is expected 
to be filed, and it is believed that the testimony which 
is to be perpetuated will not be available at the time it 
will be required in the conduct of such anticipated suit. 
The rule contains strict requirements that notice 
to the expected adverse party must be given at least 20 
days prior to the date that the applicant will appear 
before the court and seek its order authorizing perpetua-
tion. 
Here, .suit was not anticipated since it had already 
been filed. The rule covering such a situation is Rule 26, 
which authorizes depositions of any party and provides 
the method by which notice to interested parties should 
be given. 
The defendants complied with neither of these rules 
and even if the testi1nony on Dece1nber 28, 1956, had 
been recorded in writing it would have no more effect 
than an ex parte affidaYit. It cannot even rise to the 
stature of an affidavit, however, because nowhere is 
its substancp or effeet recorded, exeept in the n1inds of 
those \Vho 1nay have ehaneed to hear it. Ho\v it could 
be uperpetnated" in SUCh n fashion lllUSt re1nain a 
n1ystery. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Webster defines the terrn "perpetuate" as meaning 
''to 1nake perpetual; to give an enduring character or 
existence to a thing." Merely to state the definition 
reveals how con1pletely the defendants failed to per-
petuate the testirnony of the defendant Viola M. Treutle. 
Despite this obvious failure to comply with funda-
Inental statutory and constitutional law, the District 
Court, without ever seeing Mrs. Treutle again, and with-
out any further evidence being taken in the cause, never-
theless, on 11arch 12, 1957, made and entered its pur-
ported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce. 
At the time in que.stion, Section 30-3-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provided in part as follows: 
". . . No decree of divorce shall be granted 
upon default or otherwise, except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the ca·use . . . and the court in 
all divorce cases shall make and file its findings 
and decree upon the evidence." (emphasis added.) 
The phrase "legal evidence taken in the cause" means 
evidence which the law recognizes as proper and ad-
Inissible, and of sufficient substance that the court may 
safely base its decree thereon. 31 Corpus Juris Secundum 
Evidence, p. 506, and cases there cited. It me,ans also 
such evidence that is presented to the court in a proper 
and legal manner in compliance with the Constitution, 
the Statutes and the Rules of l)rocedure, all of which 
are designed to insure that no right of any person shall 
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be taken from him except after full compliance with 
the fundamental requirements of due process of law. 
The phrase "legal evidence taken in the cause" 
must also mean that the evidence to support a divorce 
decree must be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
law and the interest of the state, which is also an inter-
ested party in divorce actions. Nothing less than this 
standard will be sufficient. 
These principles have been recognized by this Court 
for many years. In the case of Hyrup vs. Hyrup, 66 
Utah 580, 245 ;J?ac. 335, it was said: 
"Courts are not authorized to grant divorces 
except for the particular causes prescribed by law, 
and then only when the grounds or cause for 
divorce is proved by substantial and satisfactory 
evidence." 
This decision has been repeatedly quoted with ap-
proval by this court as is evident in the case of Greener 
vs. Greener, (Utah 1949) 212 P.2d 194. 
Our systen1 of jurisprudence, \Yhich has been pains-
takingly developed in the last several hundred years, 
has been modified and simplified as the needs of the 
people and the courts have required, but despite these 
changes, there still is a basic and fundamental require-
rnent that the records of the courts shall be so meticu-
lously ntaintainPd that an independent and objective 
exatnina.tion of such reeords ean reveal all the evidence 
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and all of the facts upon which the judgment of the 
court was based. 
Despite this recognized principle, we are here con-
fronted with a purported "Decree of Divorce" based 
upon purported "Findings of Fact," which are in direct 
conflict with the official minutes of the defendant Court, 
and none of these are supported by any evidence recorded 
in any place by any officer or official of the defendant 
court at any time during the progress of the action. 
Yet it was upon this so-called evidence, received 
without notice of any kind, and nowhere recorded, that 
the court based its purported Decree. Under such cir-
cumstances it seems appropriate to quote the language of 
this Court in a case decided nearly 30 years ago, in 
which it was said: 
"The Court may have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and of the parties and still the 
judgment or Decree be void because the procedure 
employed by the Court was such that the Court 
was not authorized to assert its power in that 
way." Harnpshire vs. Woolley, Judge. (Utah, 
1928), 72 Utah 106, 269 Pac. 135. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO ENTER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND EXCEEDED 
ITS JURISDICTION, IN THAT SUMMONS DID NOT ISSUE 
WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE 
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT. 
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The complaint of defendant Viola ~1. Treutle was 
filed on September 20, 1956. Under the provisions of 
Rule 4 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summons 
"must'' issue within three months from the date of such 
filing. 
A summons is deemed to have issued when signed by 
the plaintiff or her attorney and placed in the hands 
of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Rule 
4(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A "qualified person" is defined by Rule ±(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the case of service in 
another state, includes "the sheriff of the county where 
the service is made." A Sheriff of a city located in a 
state other than Utah is not a person by whom summons 
may be served. 
Under our rule, Summons "must" issue within three 
months from the filing of the complaint, and, as was 
said in Thomas vs. District Court (Utah, 1946) 171 P. 
2d 667: 
"It is the general rule, that, if a statute pre-
scribes a method for serving process, the method 
must be followed." 
Since no suu11non.s \Y.as placed in the hands of a 
qualified person \Yithin three n1onths fron1 the date of 
filing the co1nplaint, it follo\vs that the defendant District 
( '~ourt \Vas \vithout jurisdiction and aeted in exress of 
it~ jurisdiet ion in eondueting a hearing on the n1erits 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
of the case on December 28, 1956, and, thereafter, on 
March 5, 1957, in granting a purported decree of divorce, 
which it proceeded to enter March 12, 1957. 
CONCLUSION 
The record certified to this Court shows a complete 
disregard of fundamental procedural requirements. Such 
disregard is of particularly vital significance where, as 
here, the purported decree affects the status of the 
parties and that of their minor child. The state, as well 
as these parties, ha.s an interest in the orderly determin-
ation of questions affecting this status. 
The hearings were had and the decree entered with-
out satisfying even the most elementary demands of 
due process and at a time when the District Court had 
no jurisdiction to proceed. Accordingly, the purported 
decree should be vacated and annulled by order of this 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW and 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, 
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1501 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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